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FDI Liberalization 







Three features of China’s trade patterns suggest that elements beyond factor abundance 
explain its export performance. The high penetration in world markets of labour-
intensive products has been accompanied by: (i) a high share in exports of productivity-
advanced foreign-owned enterprises (FIEs), (ii) a high penetration of FIEs in labour-
intensive sectors, and (iii) a relative high sophistication of China’s exports. We show 
that FDI liberalization endogenously introduces Ricardian features to an otherwise 
standard endowment-based trade model, strengthening China’s natural comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive products. We discuss how capital accumulation, 
productivity growth, rural-urban migration, incentives for foreign investment and 
distortions in financial markets affect this bias. We conclude that policies enhancing 
domestic firms’ production, through productivity growth or capital market distortions, 
implicitly support the capital-intensive sector. In contrast, policies that encourage FDI, 
like greater access to China’s capital and labour market would shift China’s 
comparative advantage even further towards labour-intensive products. 
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1 Introduction 
Among the many dimensions of China’s economic transformation in the last thirty 
years, the growing penetration of its exports into world markets is one of the most 
salient features. China’s exports have grown at a rate almost twice the growth of exports 
of the rest of the world, and the export pattern is strongly biased towards labour-
intensive products. This roughly corresponds to what traditional endowment-based trade 
theories predict: trade liberalization increases exports of those goods that use the 
abundant factor intensively; labour, in the case of China. 
However, three features of China’s trade performance suggest that elements beyond 
labour-abundance are behind its export patterns. First, a growing share of China’s 
exports is by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). For example, in 1993 FIEs represented 
less than 30 per cent of total exports, and in 2004 they represented almost 60 per cent of 
total exports. Second, export growth in labour-intensive goods coincides with the arrival 
of high-productivity foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to labour-intensive sectors, 
displacing domestic firms towards capital-intensive sectors. Finally, China’s exports are 
more sophisticated than those of countries with similar endowments/income. In 
particular, the higher sophistication is evident in a wider range of products exported 
(Schott 2007) and a higher share of exports of products also exported by high-income 
economies (Rodrik 2006). All these elements suggest that the liberalization of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the arrival of into labour-intensive sectors productivity-
advanced foreign-invested enterprises has played a significant role in shaping China’s 
export performance. 
Several studies have analysed the role of FDI inflows on China’s output and export 
growth.1 The evidence shows that foreign investment is positively correlated with 
export and GDP growth. This paper focuses on a different dimension of FDI 
liberalization. We study whether foreign investment has affected China’s natural 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive products. For that, we compare China’s trade 
structure with the one the country would have if it were FDI isolated. This artificial 
counterfactual is useful to distinguish conditions under which FDI liberalization 
enhances the export patterns predicted by a pure endowment-based model, or whether 
FDI integration ameliorates or even reverses the trade structure consistent with factor 
endowment differences. Conceptually, the access of productivity-advanced foreign 
firms endogenously introduces Ricardian features in the determination of comparative 
advantage. The bias and relevance of the Ricardian components depend upon the size 
and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. 
We develop a simple model of FDI in the context of a traditional endowment-based 
trade theory. Foreign firms have a productivity advantage relative to domestic firms, so 
FDI liberalization encourages foreign-investment inflows into the low-wage economy. 
A fixed cost of foreign investment sets a minimum scale that foreign firms can attain for 
FDI to take place.2 If foreign firms have access to all domestic factor markets, a trivial 
solution exists with all productivity-backward domestic firms disappearing. Motivated 
by China’s capital market restrictions, we assume that the government keeps the 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Chen, Chang and Zhang (1995); Lemoine (2000); Liu, Wang and Wei (2001); Sun 
and Parikh (2001) and Whalley and Xin (2006). 
2   See Rosen (1999) and Huang (2003) for evidence regarding costs of foreign investment. 2 
domestic capital market segmented from foreign firms’ competition, so that a low 
domestic return to capital keeps domestic firms competitive only in capital-intensive 
sectors. Unless the fixed costs of foreign investment are significantly lower in capital-
intensive sectors, FDI takes place in labour-intensive sectors, and the fall in the 
rental/wage ratio shifts domestic production towards the capital-intensive products. The 
final effect on trade patterns depends upon how large foreign firms’ penetration is.3 The 
conditions for net exports of labour-intensive products to expand after FDI liberalization 
are likely to hold for China according to the parameters of the model, meaning that 
China’s penetration in world markets of labour-intensive products is higher than the 
level predicted by its factor abundance. 
We use this framework to analyse how domestic policies are affected by bias. In 
particular, we study the impact of changes in the restrictions for foreign investment, of 
rural-urban migration, of domestic capital accumulation and domestic firms’ 
productivity growth. We show that policies that encourage FDI—like lowering 
restrictions for FDI or removing migration barriers to urban zones where foreign firms 
are located—put higher pressures on domestic wages, shrinking even more the domestic 
capital-intensive sector and enhancing net exports of labour-intensive products. The 
opposite effect follows from policies that enhance domestic firms’ production—like 
productivity growth—as they lower the scale attainable by foreign producers, lowering 
net exports of labour-intensive products. Finally, we show that capital market 
liberalization eliminates the support for unproductive domestic firms in capital-intensive 
sectors, as they cannot pay the international cost of capital and the wage rate that 
productivity-advanced foreign firms pay. In consequence, the economy specializes in 
the labour-intensive product, and the bias in the export pattern towards the labour-
intensive goods is even stronger. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next section presents some evidence on 
China’s production and trade patterns to motivate the discussion. Section 3 presents the 
model. It first discusses the pre-FDI equilibrium, and in the second part it analyses the 
effects of foreign-investment flows. Section 4 analyses the trade implications of FDI 
liberalization, and section 5 concludes. 
2 Some  empirical  evidence 
In this section we report some evidence on China’s export and FDI patterns. Many 
papers have documented China’s trade patterns and the sectoral composition of foreign 
investment (see Lemoine 2000; Huang 2003 among others), so we focus on some 
simple features to motivate the hypothesis that FDI liberalization has contributed to 
enhance China’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive products. 
Figure 1 plots total exports in China between 1993 and 2004, and the share of foreign-
invested enterprises in exports. Total exports have grown from about 100 billion dollars 
to more than 600 billion in 10 years, which represents an annual growth rate of 21  
 
                                                 
3   In a different context, Romalis (2007) analyses how lower taxes on capital in Ireland have encouraged 
FDI inflows into capital-intensive sectors, shifting Ireland’s exports towards high-technology products 
beyond its natural comparative advantage. 3 
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 Source:  National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (various issues). 
 
per cent, more than twice the growth in GDP. In the same period, total exports by FIEs 
have grown from US$25 to US$340 billion, which represents an annual rate of growth 
of 30 per cent. As a consequence, FIEs’ share in total exports increased from 28 per cent 
in 1993 to 57 per cent in 2004, contributing to almost 63 per cent of total export growth. 
These figures underestimate the share of FIEs in manufacturing exports, which in 1995 
represented 51.2 per cent of total manufacturing exports. Unfortunately, sectoral data on 
FIEs’ exports are not available after 1995. 
Figure 2 shows the composition of manufacturing exports across industries with 
different factor intensity. The figures plot industry-level net exports as a share of 
national income (for 28 3-digit ISIC level manufacturing industries) against capital per 
worker (in logs) in 1980, 1990 and 2000, obtained from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
Capital per worker for the United States in 1994 is constructed using the perpetual 
inventory method, but these results are very similar if we use other measures of sector-
specific factor intensity. In 1980, at the beginning of the reform period, there is no bias 
in China’s trade structure. By 1990, China’s has already become a net exporter of 
labour-intensive products, and this bias strengthens throughout the 1990s. By the year 
2000, China has consolidated as a net exporter of labour-intensive goods. Figure 3 plots 
the year-specific coefficient (and 95 per cent confidence interval) of a panel regression 
where the dependent variable is net exports in industry i in year t as a share of national 
income in year t and the independent variables are capital per worker in industry i and 
year dummies. There is no systematic relationship between China’s trade structure and 
capital intensity until the end of the 1980s, when a negative and significant correlation 
between net exports and capital intensity appears. This trend is consolidated during the 
1990s. 4 
Figure 2 
Net trade and capital intensity in China 
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Source:   Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 5 
Figure 3 
























































































































































Notes:   Bias of trade is the year-specific coefficient of d log NXit/d log ki; 
  Point estimate and 95% confidence interval. 
 Regressions  include  time fixed-effects. 
Although these patterns are consistent with China’s labour abundance, they coincide 
with the  strong penetration of foreign enterprises in the 1990s, especially in labour-
intensive sectors. Figure 4 plots the share of foreign-invested enterprises in sectoral 
output for 1995, 1999 and 2003. (Unfortunately, sector-specific data on FIEs’ output are 
not available before 1994, so we focus on the period 1995-2003.) The data are from 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) China’s Statistical Yearbook, which reports output 
data for different ownership categories for 28 manufacturing sectors that roughly 
correspond to 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors. We use data on aggregate net value of 
foreign assets per worker in 2003 as the measure of capital intensity, but the results are 
almost identical if we use alternative measures of factor intensity. There is a strong 
negative correlation between FIEs’ sectoral output share and capital intensity: FIEs’ 
penetration is significantly higher in labour-intensive industries, and this bias is 
relatively constant over the period.4 This suggests that the share of FIEs in sectoral 
exports is higher in labour-intensive sectors, which is the case in 1995 (see Figure 5), 
the last year for which data are available. 
Recently, some authors have shown that China’s exports are sophisticated relative to its 
level of development. For example, Schott (2007) notes that China exports a number of 
varieties to the United States that are much higher than those predicted by its factor 
endowment. Rodrik (2006) shows that China has an export basket more similar to that 
 
                                                 
4   See Claro (2006, 2007) for further evidence on this. 6 
Figure 4 
Foreign-invested enterprises share in sector-specific output in China 
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Source:   NBS (various issues). 7 
Figure 5 
Share of foreign-invested enterprises in sector-specific exports in China 
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Source:    NBS (1996) and Office of Third Industrial Census (1997). 
of high-income countries. Together with the dominant role of high-productivity foreign 
enterprises in China’s exports, this evidence suggests that FDI liberalization has not 
been neutral in shaping the country’s trade patterns. The objective of the paper is to 
explore whether FDI liberalization has been a source of comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive products in China. 
The next section presents a simple model of foreign investment. Within a traditional 
general-equilibrium endowment-based trade model, we analyse the effect of FDI 
liberalization on output and trade patterns. The model has two objectives. First, it sets a 
framework to understand why FDI liberalization in a country like China leads to the 
arrival of FIEs in labour-intensive sectors, the displacement of domestic firms towards 
capital-intensive sectors, and the high share of foreign firms in labour-intensive exports. 
Second, the model naturally yields a counterfactual to compare the actual trade structure 
with the one predicted solely by endowment differences. In other words, we analyse the 
impact of FDI liberalization on China’s trade structure by comparing China’s actual 
trade structure with the one it would have if it were completely integrated to world 
product markets but completely isolated from FDI flows. 
3 The  model 
3.1  Segmented factor markets 
Consider a small economy that faces international prices for the only two goods in this 
world:  x and z . Both goods are produced with constant-return-to-scale (CRS) 
production functions and two factors: labour L and capital K , which are internationally 
immobile. Sector x is capital-intensive, and relative factor endowment  L K k / =  is 
such that both goods are produced. The zero-profit conditions for domestic producers in 
each industry are: 8 
r a w a Kx Lx ⋅ + ⋅ = 1    and    r a w a p Kz Lz ⋅ + ⋅ =
*  (1) 
All prices are expressed in units of good  x: 
* p  is the international relative price of 
good  z , and w and r  refer to the real domestic return per unit of labour and capital 
respectively. ) / ( r w a a Fi Fi =  represent the requirements of factor  K L F , =  per unit of 
output  z x i , = , which depend on technology parameters and relative factor prices. Both 
zero-profit conditions jointly determine domestic factor prices and factor intensities. 
Production levels of x and z  follow from imposing factor market clearing conditions 
given equilibrium factor usage.5 
Consider that the domestic country is productivity-backward with respect to the rest of 
the world, which is represented by a foreign country that produces both x and z , and 
where international product prices are set. Productivity differences are represented by 
the part of cross-country differences in average factor productivity that cannot be 
explained by differences in relative factor prices. Analytically, international differences 
in average factor productivity are expressed as: 
) ( ) 1 (
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⋅ + =    (2) 
where  0 ≥ δ  is the Hicks-neutral productivity gap between the domestic and foreign 
countries (common across sectors), and  ) (ω i l  and  ) (ω i k  measure the effect on average 
factor productivity of relative factor price ratio  ) / /( ) / (
* * r w r w = ω , with 
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = = i i k l  and  0 / ) ( < ∂ ∂ ω ω i l  and  0 / ) ( > ∂ ∂ ω ω i k .6 We assume there are 
international productivity differences in order to provide a rationale for wage-driven 
foreign investment, which is arguably relevant for the case of China. We also assume 
that productivity differences are Hicks-neutral so that in the base scenario—full trade 
integration but FDI isolation—trade patterns are solely determined by factor endowment 
differences. Therefore, we can compare trade patterns under FDI integration with those 
implied by factor-endowment differences. 
In equilibrium, because productivity differences are similar across industries,  1 = ω  and 










w a a , (3) 
                                                 
5   The two equations in (1) determine w  and r . Both goods are produced in equilibrium as long as 
) / ( ) / ( r w k k r w k z x > >  where  Li Ki i a a r w k / ) / ( = . 
6   Along an isoquant of a constant-return-to-scale production function,  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ r w a i Ki Li − − = σ θ  and 
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ r w a i Li Ki − = σ θ  where  x dx x / ˆ = ,  i σ  is the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital, and  Fi θ  is the share of factor F  in total output in sector i . It follows that 
)] 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 (
* − − ⋅ ⋅ + = ω σ θ δ i Ki Li Li a a  and  )] 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 (
* − + ⋅ ⋅ + = ω σ θ δ i Li Ki Ki a a . These 
expressions define  ) (ω i l  and  ) (ω i k . 9 
where subscript a denotes autarky (pre FDI liberalization) levels.7 Assuming identical 
and homothetic preferences across countries, the trade pattern is identical to the one 
predicted by the traditional two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model. A capital-abundant 
country exports the capital-intensive good while the opposite happens in a labour-

















   (4) 
3.2  Capital and technology flows 
Factor price differences encourage foreign firms to move capital and technology to the 
low-wage domestic economy in order to enjoy low labour costs. In particular, we 
consider that each unit of foreign capital is embedded with foreign advanced 
technology. Despite the fact that the domestic return to capital is lower than the foreign 
return 
* r , foreign units of capital in the domestic economy can obtain a capital return 
higher than 
* r  by employing low-wage domestic labour. We assume that foreign 
production units only have access to the domestic labour market, while domestic capital 
cannot be combined with foreign advanced technology. If technology-advanced foreign 
firms had access to all domestic factor markets, there would be no room for 
productivity-backward domestic firms. To rule out this case and to allow for positive 
production of productivity-backward domestic units, we assume that some factors, 
capital in this case, remain segmented from international competition.8 The evidence of 
preferential access to credit by domestic firms in China—especially state-owned—
suggests that this is a reasonable assumption. Consequently, the return to domestic 
capital is endogenously determined. 
The attractiveness of low domestic wages for technology-advanced foreign capital is 
however compensated with a firm- and sector-specific fixed (but not sunk) cost  i F —
expressed in units of good  x—of foreign production. Notice that the fixed cost is not 
faced by foreign producers in their home economy. Decreasing average cost of foreign 
firms’ domestic production means that foreign capital will flow to the domestic country 
in sectors x and/or z  as long as 
*





r a w a + + ≥  (5) 
and 
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r a w a p + + ≥    (5′) 
                                                 
7   The assumption that cross-country factor endowment differences are not too large rules out the 
possibility that wage differences are affected by differences in labour abundance. However, all the 
results of the paper hold if international factor price differences arise from factor-endowment as well 
as technological differences. 
8   It is important to highlight that capital is meant to represent those factors whose markers remain 
segmented from foreign firms’ access. 10 
where  w is the post-integration real domestic wage rate and 
* * * * * / / Li i Ki i i a L a K q = =  is 
the output level of the foreign producer in industry i in the host country, with 
*
i K  being 
the amount of foreign capital in industry i and 
*
i L  being foreign firms’ employment in 
industry i. We assume that the foreign economy is large enough so that capital outflows 
imbedded in FDI flows do not affect factor prices in the source country. 
 Foreign firms’ minimum labour requirement 
In equilibrium, the marginal unit of foreign capital must be indifferent between 
producing in its home country and moving to the low-wage country, meaning that (5) 
and/or (5′) determine the minimum scale of production of a foreign producer in industry 
i consistent with zero profits. In each industry, this relationship is expressed as 
) (
* w f L i i = , which defines the minimum level of employment of a foreign firm 
*
i L —and 
hence production—that is compatible with the zero profit condition for any w. 
Analytically, ) (w fi  is derived imposing equality in (5) and (5’). To obtain a closed-
form solution we consider the following Cobb-Douglas production functions in both 
sectors: 
α αK AL x
− =
1  and 
β βK AL z
− =
1  where  β α > . The total-factor-productivity 
coefficient in the foreign country is equal to  A A ) 1 (
* δ + =  with  0 ≥ δ . Solving for 
*
Fi a  













− .   (6) 
where  Li θ  is the labour share in industry i, i.e.,  ) 1 ( α −  in industry x and  ) 1 ( β −  in 




/ 1 * ) 1 ( − ⋅ = . Intuitively, a low domestic wage rate w induces foreign 
producers to choose a very labour-intensive production technique in the host economy, 
meaning that the labour requirement consistent with zero profits is very high. Indeed, 
∞ = →
*
0 lim i w L . As domestic wages increase, the evolution of foreign producers’ labour 
requirements depends upon two competing forces: while production shifts towards a 
more capital-intensive technique, labour requirements decline but a higher wage rate 
shrinks the cost advantage of foreign producers, increasing the scale of production 
required to compensate  i F . Finally, as w approaches 
* w ,  ∞ →
*
i L  as the fixed cost 
eliminates the possibility of foreign investment. Figure 6 depicts  ) (w fi , which depends 
upon two variables. First, labour requirements are higher in the industry with highest 
fixed cost, as  i F  raises the production scale consistent with zero profits. Second, labour 
requirements are lower in labour-intensive industries (high 
*
Li θ ). In the upward sloping 
segment of  ) (w fi —that, as discussed below, is the relevant segment- foreign firms in 
labour-intensive industries benefit more from low wages, and hence they are able to 
offer higher labour payments at the same level of employment. Therefore, if  x z F F =  
then ) ( ) ( w f w f x z < . 
 11 
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Figure 6 
Foreign firms’ minimum labour requirement  
) , ; (
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Because the fixed cost is firm specific, if FDI takes place in equilibrium, all foreign 
investment flows are concentrated in one production unit (firm), meaning that flows of 
technology-advanced foreign capital are subject to a common fixed cost. The presence 
of a firm-specific fixed cost implies that wage pressures are the greatest if only one firm 
brings foreign capital to the domestic economy. This firm belongs to the sector that is 
able to bid up domestic wages, i.e., the industry with the lowest fixed cost or the labour-
intensive industry. This implication is the natural result of the homogeneous-good CRS 
framework, but we believe it does not weaken the model as long as we focus on the bias 
of FDI across sectors rather than the dispersion and concentration of FDI within sectors.  
Also, w never reaches w
* (because Fi > 0) and the wage-rental ratio faced by the foreign 
producer in the domestic country is lower than in the home country, meaning that the 
FDI firm chooses a more labour-intensive production technique than firms in the same 
industry in the foreign country.9 Finally, as  i F  approaches zero, there is no minimum 
scale requirement for foreign producers, so fi (w) is vertical at w = w
*, which means that 
                                                 
9  See Lipsey, Kravis and Roldan (1982), and Kravis and Lipsey (1988) for empirical evidence. See also 
Lipsey (2002) for a survey. 12 
FDI inflows generate international factor price equalization. Conversely, if the domestic 
labour supply is infinitely elastic (Findlay 1978), fi (w) is horizontal at the level of 
foreign firms’ domestic employment consistent with zero profits.10 
Residual domestic labour supply 
The second equilibrium relationship follows from identifying the residual domestic 
labour supply available for foreign production. We assume that the domestic capital 
market remains segmented, which means that equilibrium in the domestic capital market 
determines the level of domestic firms’ employment—as a function of the domestic 
wage rate—consistent with optimal factor usage of domestic producers. The residual 
labour supply available for foreign producers is the difference between total labour 
supply (that is assumed totally inelastic) and domestic firms’ employment. In other 
words, the size of foreign investment and employment is limited by the level of 
domestic employment consistent with equilibrium in the domestic capital market, which 
depends upon the domestic wage rate. There are two different scenarios:  a w w >  or 
a w w = . It is not possible that  a w w <  because domestic workers can always receive the 
autarky wage rate. 
Consider first that  a w w > . If the post FDI equilibrium wage rate is higher than the pre-
liberalization level, the labour-intensive domestic industry is rendered uncompetitive. 
The return to domestic capital r  falls below  a r , and all domestic capital shifts towards 
the capital-intensive industry. For each wage level there is a unique level of 
employment of domestic producers that assures domestic capital market clearing. The 








=  (7) 
where  K  and L  represent the domestic capital and labour endowments, and 
* L  is 
domestic employment by foreign producers. Expression (7) defines an upward-sloping 
relationship between foreign firms’ employment and the domestic wage rate  ) (
* w h L = , 
with  0 ) ( ' > w h . Intuitively, a higher domestic wage rate shifts production of domestic 
firms in industry x towards a more capital-intensive technique, releasing more labour 
for foreign producers. Recall that the domestic capital return is endogenously 
determined, which means that a higher domestic wage rate leads to a lower capital 
return and a lower rental/wage ratio. For the Cobb-Douglas specification described 



























k L w h    (8) 
                                                 
10  If the domestic labour supply is totally elastic at  w w = , there is a unique level of foreign firms’ 
production and employment consistent with the zero-profit condition 13 
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* L  
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* w
with 0 ) ( ' > w h  and  0 ) ( ' ' < w h . A higher domestic wage rate, and hence a higher  r w/ , 
encourages the use of capital in domestic firms in sector x. Given K , employment of 
domestic firms falls and hence domestic labour available for foreign producers 
increases. The second derivative reveals that the rate at which employment is released 
from domestic firms in sector x decreases as w rises. 
For  a w w = , domestic production is viable in both sectors. Capital market clearing is 
consistent with different employment levels by domestic producers as in the traditional 
Rybczynski parallelogram. Therefore, employment available for foreign firms is 
bounded between zero (pre-FDI liberalization equilibrium) and the employment level 
consistent with specialization in the capital-intensive good x, which is  ) ( a w h . Figure 7 
depicts  ) (w h . The amount of labour available for foreign producers at any level of w 
increases with L and it decreases with relative capital-abundance k . The intuition in 
both cases is the same: The larger or the more labour-abundant the domestic country is, 
the higher the residual level of employment consistent with capital market equilibrium 
at any w. Also,  ) (w h  increases with δ . For any w, the greater the δ  the lower the 
domestic return to capital faced by domestic producers, which implies a higher wage-
rental ratio and a more capital-intensive production technique of domestic producers in 
the capital-intensive industry. Consequently, more labour is available for foreign 
production. 
Figure 7 































An equilibrium with FDI is reached when the residual labour supply is equal to the 
minimum labour requirement of foreign producers. There are two possible solutions, 
depending on whether the conditions for positive FDI are satisfied or not. Consider first 
that ) (w h  and  ) (w f  do not intersect each other, as in panel (A) in Figure 8. In such 
case, there is no equilibrium with FDI and the domestic wage rate is  a w . Conceptually, 
the foreign producer cannot attain the scale that compensates for the fixed cost of 
production. At any wage rate, the minimum employment level that a foreign producer 
requires to compensate the fixed cost is higher than the residual labour supply consistent 
with domestic capital market clearing condition. The likelihood of this equilibrium is 
higher (i) if the fixed cost of foreign investment is high enough, (ii) if the domestic 
economy is small and/or too capital abundant (low L  and high k ), and (iii) if the 
technology disadvantage of the domestic country is small (low δ ). The lack of FDI 
inflows into China before 1990 can be either the result of a prohibition for foreign 
investment or a high-enough fixed cost for foreign enterprises to install production 
facilities in China. 
Otherwise, when  ) (w h  and  ) (w f  intersect each other, there are three possible 
equilibriums. The autarky equilibrium is still valid, as the return to capital in foreign 
firms is 
* r , which is equal to the capital return in the source economy. There are two 
additional equilibriums with FDI: a low-wage low-FDI and high-wage high-FDI 
equilibrium. In the high-wage equilibrium—labelled B  in panel (B)—the domestic 
economy specializes completely in the production of the capital-intensive good, i.e., all 
domestic capital is employed in sector x, in response to the rise in  r w/ . The low-wage 
low-FDI equilibrium, labelled  A, might or might not have a wage rate higher than the 
pre-liberalization level. As depicted in panel (B), the wage rate increases and there is 
full domestic specialization in the capital-intensive good. The scale of foreign firm’s 
production is relatively small. In panel (C), FDI takes place in equilibrium without an 
increase in the domestic wage rate, and domestic firms continue producing both goods. 
The scale of foreign firms’ production is lower than in panel (B). 
The low-wage low-FDI equilibrium is unstable. A marginal increase in w above  A w  
generates excess demand for labour, as foreign producers are willing to expand 
infinitely, driving domestic wages to  B w . Likewise, a fall in w from  A w  generates 
excess supply of labour, as the residual supply for foreign producers is smaller than the 
minimum foreign employment scale, bringing the economy towards its autarky 
equilibrium. In contrast, both the autarky and the high-wage high-FDI equilibriums are 
stable.11 If the conditions for an equilibrium with FDI hold, we cannot predict whether 
the autarky equilibrium will persist or whether the economy will move towards the 
high-wage high-FDI equilibrium. In this paper, however, we assume that the stable FDI 
equilibrium takes place. The evidence of high FDI penetration in China suggests that 
this is a reasonable assumption. Besides, at least from a theoretical perspective, China is 
likely to satisfy the condition for an equilibrium with FDI to exist: large labour-
abundant and productivity backward country. Two features of this equilibrium are 
relevant for our analysis. First, FDI inflows shift domestic production towards the 
 
                                                 
11 The condition for stability is that  ) ( ' ) ( ' w h w f > . 15 
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capital-intensive sector. The rise in the relative price of labour for domestic producers 
renders domestic production uncompetitive in the labour-intensive industry, shifting the 
pattern of domestic production towards the capital-intensive sector. Interestingly, this 
effect is more likely and stronger in countries with a (pre-FDI liberalization) 
comparative advantage in the labour-intensive good. This is consistent with the 
evidence that the access of productivity advanced foreign firms have pushed domestic 
firms towards the capital-intensive sectors. 
4  Implications for trade 
In this section we compare the trade pattern of the domestic economy with and without 
FDI integration. For simplicity, we assume that preferences are such that a share γ  of 
national income is spent in the labour-intensive good z  and a share  γ − 1  is spent in the 
capital intensive good x. Therefore, net trade of both goods as a share of income is 
given by; 
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where  I  is national income expressed in terms of good x ( K r L w + ), and x and  z p
*  
are the real value of output of both products. Without FDI integration, net trade of the 































































z t  is net export of good z  in autarky (FDI isolation). As expected, 
a
z t  is 
decreasing on k , which means that labour-abundant countries export the labour-
intensive good. In this case, we assume that k  is such that  0 >
a
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z  17 
where  w is the equilibrium wage rate with FDI integration. Notice that net trade of the 
labour-intensive good not only depends upon k  but it also depends upon the technology 
gap δ  as well as on the post-integration wage rate, which also depends on k  and δ  as 
well as L  and  z F . This expression assumes that the condition for an equilibrium with 
positive FDI exists, and that the equilibrium wage rate is such that the domestic 
economy specializes in the capital-intensive good. 
The necessary condition for FDI integration to enhance net exports of the labour-
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β k J k G  (9) 
where  w w /
* = ω , and  1 ) , , ( > ω δ k J .12 It turns out that unless  β α ≈ , that is, unless 
the factor intensity of both sectors is very similar,  0 ) , , ( > ω δ k G . International wage 
data from ILO reveal that the ratio of China’s average wages to average wages in the 
rest of the world have evolved from around 4 to 10 per cent between 1990 and 2000 if 
we consider all countries in the world, and it has grown from 3 to 5 per cent when we 
only consider countries that are the main sources of FDI into China. This means that 
w w /
* = ω  is between 30 and 10 depending upon the sample considered. Therefore, for 
reasonable values of α  and β , expression (9) shows that the conditions for FDI 
liberalization to increase net exports of labour-intensive products (as a share of national 
income) in China hold. 
To get an intuition on the determinants of the bias in the trade structure introduced by 
FDI inflows, we analyse how  ) , , ( δ ω k G  varies with L ,  z F ,  k  and δ . Changes in L  
and  z F  affect comparative advantage directly through their impact on the equilibrium 
the international/domestic wage ratio  w w /
* = ω , while changes in k  and δ  have both 
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x k  
is the capital-labour ratio in the capital-intensive sector before FDI integration. 18 
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We know from section 3 that ω  decreases as  z F  falls ( 0 / > ∂ ∂ z F ω ) and that ω  
decreases as the labour force increases ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ L ω ). Also, ω  increases as the domestic 
economy becomes more capital abundant ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ k ω ), and ω  increases as the 
productivity gap δ  falls ( 0 ) 1 ( / < + ∂ ∂ δ ω ). The sign of  ω ∂ ∂ / G  depends upon the size 
of  ) 1 , 0 ( )) 1 /( ( ) / (
/ 1 ∈ + ⋅
α δ ω
a
x k k . For small enough values of 
α δ ω
/ 1 )) 1 /( ( ) / ( + ⋅
a
x k k , 
i.e., if the domestic economy is very labour abundant or if FDI inflows have a relatively 
high impact on domestic wages,  0 / > ∂ ∂ ω G  meaning that a marginal increase in 
domestic wages shifts comparative advantage towards the capital-intensive product. The 
opposite happens if 
α δ ω
/ 1 )) 1 /( ( ) / ( + ⋅
a
x k k  is relatively high. 
We do not observe 
α δ ω
/ 1 )) 1 /( ( ) / ( + ⋅
a
x k k , but according to Equation (8), in equilibrium 
this expression is equal to  L L / 1
* − , which is the share of domestic firms in total 
employment. For example, in 2004 foreign firms’ employment represented 25 per cent 
of total manufacturing employment (China Markets Yearbook 2005), which assures that 
0 / < ∂ ∂ ω G . Therefore,  0 / < ∂ ∂ z F G , meaning that policies that lower the fixed cost of 
foreign investment not only encourage FDI inflows in the labour-intensive sector, but 
they also increase net exports of the labour-intensive good as a share of national income 
relative to a scenario of FDI isolation. A lower  z F  increases FDI in the labour-intensive 
sector, pressuring wages up and lowering domestic capital-intensive production. The net 
effect is an increase in exports of the labour-intensive product as share of national 
income. Notice, however, that if the decrease in the fixed cost of foreign production is 
higher in capital-intensive sectors, FDI might shift completely to the capital-intensive 
production. Because the domestic wage/rental ratio is still higher than the pre-
integration equilibrium, the domestic sector also specializes in the capital-intensive 
good and labour-abundant economy becomes a net exporter of the capital-intensive 
product. Even a small inflow of foreign capital into the capital-intensive sector can 
generate this result, meaning that from an aggregate perspective, the link between 
capital/labour endowment and trade patterns is broken down. 
A similar results follows from an increase in labour-supply ( 0 / > ∂ ∂ L G ), which can be 
interpreted as a policy that relaxes rural-urban migration restrictions. In a scenario 
without FDI liberalization, the increase in L  raises both exports and output of the 
labour-intensive good, without affecting the export-income ratio. With FDI 
liberalization, the rise in L  encourages the arrival of foreign firms and lowers domestic 
employment in the capital-intensive sector, enhancing the export/income ratio of the 
labour-intensive good. 
Domestic capital accumulation has two competing effects on comparative advantage. 
On the one hand, capital accumulation encourages the production of capital-intensive 
goods, meaning that comparative advantage shifts away from the labour-intensive 
industry. However, this Rybczynski effect is stronger under FDI isolation because the 
capital-labour ratio in the domestic economy is lower. Analytically,  0 / < ∂ ∂
=ω ω k G . On 
the other hand, a higher k  discourages the arrival of foreign-invested firms because of 19 
the lower attainable scale of production, decreasing the comparative in the labour-
intensive good. The net effect depends upon the relative strength of both effects. 
Domestic firms’ technological progress unambiguously weakens comparative advantage 
in the labour-intensive good relative to an equilibrium without FDI integration. Two 
mechanisms generate this result. First, a higher domestic productivity discourages FDI, 
enhancing the production of domestic firms in the capital-intensive sector. Second, even 
without factor mobility from foreign to domestic firms, the higher domestic productivity 
raises output in the capital-intensive industry and raises national income, meaning that 
net exports of the labour-intensive commodity as a share of national income fall 
( 0 ) 1 ( / > + ∂ ∂
=ω ω δ G ). Overall,  0 ) 1 ( / > + ∂ ∂ δ G . 
A final implication follows from analysing the role of capital market segmentation in 
China. The model assumes that the domestic capital market remains segmented from 
foreign firms’ access, meaning that the return to domestic capital is endogenously 
determined, and in equilibrium it is lower than the international level due to the lower 
productivity of domestic firms. The removal of capital market distortions render 
unproductive domestic firms uncompetitive in all industries, because firms cannot offer 
capital a return equal to its opportunity cost. In other words, there is no room for 
productivity-backward firms in a context where productivity-advanced firms have 
access to all domestic factors. Therefore, only foreign firms produce in equilibrium, and 
the sectoral composition of output will depend on sectoral differences in the relative 
cost of foreign investment. Unless the fixed cost of FDI is significantly lower in capital-
intensive sectors, the economy specializes in the labour-intensive industry, meaning that 
net exports of the labour-intensive product would increase. In terms of Figure 8, capital 
market integration implies that  ) (w h  becomes horizontal at  L L =
* , and the fixed cost 
of foreign investment only affects the domestic wage rate. 
5 Conclusions 
Although China is undoubtedly a labour-abundant economy, the extent of its penetration 
into world markets in the last 20 years in labour-intensive commodities has surprised 
even the most optimistic analysts. The evidence that China’s export boom has coincided 
with a huge penetration of foreign-invested firms into labour-intensive sectors suggests 
that elements beyond traditional endowment-based considerations explain the export 
performance of China. This paper argues that FDI liberalization has introduced a 
Ricardian component in the determination of comparative advantage in China that has 
enhanced net exports in labour-intensive products. We show that FDI liberalization 
enhances the arrival of productivity-advanced foreign firms to the labour-intensive 
industry, where the benefits from low domestic wages are larger, and domestic capital 
market segmentation supports the production of productivity-backward domestic firms 
in the capital-intensive sector. Under certain conditions, that are likely to hold for 
China, the former effect dominates and FDI liberalization shifts comparative advantage 
towards the labour-intensive product. In other words, China’s high export share of 
labour-intensive products reflects both its labour-abundance as well as a higher relative 
productivity in labour-intensive sectors as consequence of foreign firms’ penetration. 
These Ricardian determinants of comparative advantage arise endogenously in response 
to international factor price differences and FDI liberalization. 20 
This simple mechanism is capable of explaining many features of China’s economy, 
like the sectoral bias of FIEs’ market share, the high share of foreign firms in total 
exports, and the low return to capital in productivity-backward domestic firms. 
Although the model is built upon the idea of homogeneous products, the high 
sophistication of China’s exports may also reflect the predominance of productivity-
advanced foreign firms in China’s labour-intensive exports. 
We conclude showing that capital market liberalization not only leads to the 
disappearance of the low-productivity domestic sector but also further enhances the 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive products. The opposite happens if policies to 
promote FDI in capital-intensive sectors lower significantly the cost of FDI in those 
industries. If the benefits for foreign investment of capital-intensive firms dominate the 
labour-cost benefit favouring labour-intensive foreign firms, the Ricardian advantage in 
capital-intensive sectors dominates the factor-endowment advantage in the labour-
intensive sector. 
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